|Title||Proposals for a More Equitable General Assembly Voting Structure|
|Year of Publication||1989|
This monograph explores alternatives to the one-nation one-vote system employed by the General Assembly. The author concludes that a weighted voting system would be preferable and could be achieved by amending Assembly procedural rules without amending the Charter - 29 pages.
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Excerpts from Mr. Morrow's Conclusions: The Binding Triad proposal developed by the Center for War/Peace Studies is currently receiving the greatest amount of discussion among groups interested in voting reform. It would not only remedy the flawed voting structure but would also make decisions "binding" on Member States.
The amendment of Articles 13 and 18 in order to accomplish this would be a substantial and worthwhile reform. However, prospects for Charter change are bleak at this time. Nations still cling stubbornly to their sovereignty and fear making Assembly resolutions binding.
However, substantial reform on the basis of the triad triple tally may be possible without Charter amendment. The adoption of new rules of procedure in the Assembly enabling important matters to be referred to committees voting on the triad basis that General Assembly resolutions on important questions be adopted only after achieving a two-thirds majority of each of the following: (1) members present and voting; (2) the total population of the UN members present and voting; and (3) the contributions to the regular UN budget of those present and voting.
(Excerpts taken from pages: 25-27 of Monograph 5)