|Title||Alternative Voting Systems in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve UN General Assembly Decision|
|Year of Publication||2001|
This monograph analyzes weighting factors in international organizations and explains a proposal to amend the United Nations Charter to allow the General Assembly to pass binding resolution with approval of a supermajority of members. Under this proposal, for a resolution to be binding, it would require the support of nations whose combined contributions in dues comprise a majority of the U.N. budget and combined population's compromise a majority of the world population.
|Full Text|| |
Excerpts from Mr. Szasz's Conclusions:
It thus has become timely to think seriously of introducing some kind of weighting of votes in the General Assembly's decision-making process - particularly in respect of certain especially significant decisions... As to weighting, only two possible factors commend themselves: population and contributions. However as both of these would, if based on raw data, lead to apparent inequities in the opposite direction (i.e., to excessive power to the most populous and richest states), some formula for compressing the raw figures should be developed.
Arguably another defect in the operations of the General Assembly is that, except in respect of matters substantially internal to the organization, it only has the power to make recommendations...various defects in the treaty-making and adopting process make it desirable that this process be supplemented by one for the direct adoption of legislation by the General Assembly.
(Excerpts taken from pages 59 & 60 of Monograph 17)