Alternative Voting Systems in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve UN General Assembly Decision

TitleAlternative Voting Systems in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve UN General Assembly Decision
Publication TypeMonographs
Year of Publication2001
AuthorsSzasz PC
Abstract

This monograph analyzes weighting factors in international organizations and explains a proposal to amend the United Nations Charter to allow the General Assembly to pass binding resolution with approval of a supermajority of members. Under this proposal, for a resolution to be binding, it would require the support of nations whose combined contributions in dues comprise a majority of the U.N. budget and combined population's compromise a majority of the world population.

Full Text

Excerpts from Mr. Szasz's Conclusions:
The unanticipated drastic change in the composition of the Assembly, the OMOV (one member one vote) rule... led to the practice of adopting numerous resolutions that did not in fact represent the will of a significant portion of the world community. This in turn led to the resort to consensus decision making, which in many respects constitutes a retreat to the unanimity principles of the League of Nations.

It thus has become timely to think seriously of introducing some kind of weighting of votes in the General Assembly's decision-making process - particularly in respect of certain especially significant decisions... As to weighting, only two possible factors commend themselves: population and contributions. However as both of these would, if based on raw data, lead to apparent inequities in the opposite direction (i.e., to excessive power to the most populous and richest states), some formula for compressing the raw figures should be developed.

Arguably another defect in the operations of the General Assembly is that, except in respect of matters substantially internal to the organization, it only has the power to make recommendations...various defects in the treaty-making and adopting process make it desirable that this process be supplemented by one for the direct adoption of legislation by the General Assembly.

(Excerpts taken from pages 59 & 60 of Monograph 17)